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Impact of microcredit on rural households: An evaluation using panel data 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of microcredit on rural households. The impact of a microcredit 
program on target households is subject to two main sources of bias, observed and unobserved bias. To 
evaluate the microcredit program’s impact, we used the 2006 and 2008 Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys and applied the Propensity Score Matching approach and Fixed Effects models. The 
results show a greater consumption and income impact for the ‘true poor’ when only the poor group is 
included in the comparison. This implies that the ‘true poor’ benefit more from involvement with a 
microcredit program than do low-income households. In addition, greater impacts were identified in the 
Mekong River Delta, assuming that endogeneity is significantly controlled for in the models. 
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Rural finance plays an important role in the Vietnamese economy. However, providing loans to the rural 
poor remains a difficult task because of the nature of the rural credit market and the lending procedures 
that prevent rural households, particularly the poor, to access credit. The poor and low income 
households face two main problems in borrowing from commercial banks. First, most poor households 
have no collateral and are not able to borrow against their future income. Second, banks find it costly to 
deal with small credit transactions, such as individual lending and lending through microcredit program. 
Without any external support the rural poor find it difficult to access formal credit hence they seek 
alternative sources of credit. Therefore, improving formal credit access through subsidized microcredit 
programs is considered as a strategic tool to support the rural poor. Although government intervention 
in rural credit markets is controversial, this intervention is widely accepted because it can overcome 
loan failures in these markets.  
 
In Vietnam, formal credit is available through individual lending and group lending schemes. Group 
lending schemes notably improve repayment incentives and monitoring through peer pressure based on 
the joint-liability principle. Grouping and sharing information among credit group members also helps to 
build support networks and educate borrowers (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; Karlan & Goldberg, 2007). 
However, individual lending is quite a popular practice in Vietnam. Another form of lending where 
microcredit is distributed to individuals is also widely practiced in the rural credit market. This lending 
practice relies on the joint-liability principle in a credit group but the loans are subject to individual 
liability. Specifically, the borrowers are required to form a group, including a number of certified poor 
members and a group leader without joint liability specification. Quach (2005) shows that lending 
through a group in microcredit program in Vietnam helps to reduce transaction costs as it deals with 
asymmetric information more effectively than lending to individuals.    
 
The Vietnamese rural credit market is characterized as being fragmented, heavily subsidized, with a high 
degree of government intervention, and with many credit providers coexisting to serve the clients 
(McCarty, 2001). The credit market is dominated by state-owned bank providers; the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBRAD), the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) and the People’s 
Credit Funds (PCFs). Together, these control as much as 70% of the total credit (World Bank, 2002). 
VBRAD has branches at the district level and only to a limited extent at the commune level; therefore, 
outreach to the poorer households in remote and rural communes is limited. In addition, biasedness in 
risk assessment and complicated administrative procedures contribute to the underdevelopment of 
VBRAD’s operation (Putzey, 2002). To overcome the VBRAD’s operational weaknesses, the VBP and the 
PCFs were established to address the credit needs of the rural poor. The PCFs, whose objectives are to 
restore public confidence in the formal rural finance system, aim at mobilizing savings from its 
members. Since the PCFs’ networks have been predominantly established in areas that are economically 
better off and have better developed infrastructure, the PCFs plays a limited role in microcredit 
provision. 
 
The Vietnam Bank for the Poor began operation in 1996, providing credit at low interest rates through 
formal microcredit programs to the rural poor who did not qualify for individual loans because of limited 
collateral. In 2003, it was renamed the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). Its operations have been 
modified to focus on the poor and it closely cooperates with local organizations in lending procedures. 
For example, the Commune People’s Committees help the VBSP to verify poor and socially 
disadvantaged groups. Other social mass organizations in villages such as the Women’s Union and the 
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Farmers’ Associations help the VBSP to monitor the loans. Collateral is not required for loans, but the 
social mass organizations provide a Guarantee Fund. If the borrowers default, the VBSP will take a 
portion of the guaranteed fund. To ensure repayment, the social mass organizations organize the 
borrowers into credit groups. Joint-liability groups were also formed in the initial stage of the 
microcredit lending, a practice later replaced by flexible group lending strategy in which the individual is 
liable only for her or his loan, but not for those of other group members (Bhole & Ogden, 2010). 
 
Despite the establishment of numerous microcredit policies targeting the rural credit market over the 
past two decades, Vietnam is still home to over 12 million people (14.2% of the population) living in 
poverty (World Bank, 2008). The majority of households in rural areas suffer a variety of poor living 
conditions such as temporary housing, lack of fixed assets, and unstable incomes. In addition, 
accessibility to credit has remained one of the main difficulties that hinder agricultural productivity and 
improvement the country’s poverty and rural development strategy programs. Pham and Izumida (2002) 
show that as much as 30% of farm households were unable to borrow from formal lenders. Improving 
access to microcredit is therefore one of the main objectives of many microcredit programs targeting 
rural households and the poor.  This is because credit is believed to improve rural households’ livelihood 
by improving productivity, and smoothing consumption and income irregularities. However, improving 
microcredit access for the poor incurs costs that raise the cost-benefit question of how much these 
microcredit programs impact the target group.  
 
Most microcredit programs in Vietnam are managed by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). 
Since its official establishment in 2003, studies evaluating the impact of the VBSP microcredit program 
on target households have been sporadically done at national, regional and local levels. Few studies 
have focussed on the evaluating the impact of the program on the Mekong River Delta (MRD). This 
study examines the impact of the microcredit program impact on the MRD and to enrich the field of 
microcredit program impact evaluation.   
 
Accessibility to microcredit programs undeniably has desired impacts on the poor. However, 
interpretations of the impact of these programs have proven to be controversial. Impact evaluation 
inferences are sensitive to their evaluation methods and assumptions; different impact evaluation 
methods depend on their specific assumptions to resolve the missing data problem. This implies that 
different methods of data collection will encounter different missing data problems, such that a chosen 
econometric evaluation method may thereby perform better than others for program impact 
assessment. Moreover, evaluation of the impact of a microcredit program should address informal 
credit as an alternative source of credit relative to the formal microcredit program. This is because 
informal credit is prevalent in the rural markets in developing countries. In Vietnam, the formal and 
informal credit sectors coexist to serve clients. Failure to control for complementarity and 
substitutability between the formal and informal credit sectors when evaluating the impact of formal 
microcredit programs likely overestimate the positive impact of these programs.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated the long-term impact of credit on household 
welfare in rural Vietnam. The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence on the long-term 
impact of credit on household welfare, using panel data based analysis. If we can observe a household 
who borrows in two periods, we can see the difference (or change) in the amount borrowed and 
household welfare. If the change in household welfare is correlated with a change in household 
borrowing, it reveals the long-term relationship. However, long-term impact of microcredit program 
remains questionable due to limited data. Khandker (2003) shows the main difference between cross-
sectional data based analysis and panel data based analysis is that the former shows the comparison 
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across households while the latter shows the movement within households. Hence, long-term impact is 
likely to be subjected to changes in the environment that the program is being implemented. 
 
This study examines the impact of microcredit programs on the incomes and consumption patterns of 
rural households in the Mekong River Delta, Vietnam. In order to do so, we present an overview of the 
rural credit programs that target the rural credit market. We then evaluate these programs using 
estimation techniques that control for the exogenous contribution of informal credit to income and 
consumption patterns of this group in rural Vietnam. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 describes the data and research method for impact evaluation. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical results and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Data and research method 
 
The data used for impact evaluation of the VBSP microcredit program were drawn from the 2006 and 
2008 VHLSS surveys. The VHLSS surveys contain information both at household and commune levels. At 
the household level, each survey contains a sample of 9,189 households and the two datasets form a 
panel dataset of 4,127 Vietnamese households. The panel data contain information about the 
households for two separate years, including the urban and rural population. Only the rural sample is 
used in this study. At commune level, information on commune characteristics was collected from 2,880 
and 2,219 communes in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, respectively. These data consist of demographic 
and general information regarding communes, general economic conditions and aid programs, non-farm 
employment, agricultural production, local infrastructure and transportation, education, health, and 
social affairs. The commune data were then merged with the household data to form a combined panel 
dataset that includes household, village and commune characteristics. Another panel dataset of 866 
households was also drawn from the VHLSS surveys for the MRD. 
 
The VHLSS data contain information on demography, income, expenditure, education, health care, 
employment, fixed assets and durable goods and particularly, access to finance through formal or 
informal credit. The information on household members’ characteristics such as age, gender, place of 
residence, educational qualifications, as well as information on expenditure and income is used for the 
analysis. Information about participation in microcredit programs such as loans, values of loans, the 
interest rate from different banks and social funds, loan purposes are also used. A description of the 
variables is provided in Table 1. 
 
The panel data can be used to estimate the unbiased program impact if the two years’ data are collected 
before and after the program implementation, respectively. In other words, we need to have a baseline 
dataset before the VBSP microcredit program was officially established and implemented in 2003 and 
one post period. Since our first dataset was collected in 2006 when the VBSP microcredit program was 
already in operation, Nguyen (2008) raises concerns of bias in program impact using only the post-
program data because there may be significant differences between the control and treated groups in 
the first period. Therefore, adjustments are required before the panel data can be used in the fixed 
effects model.  
 
To deal with the data issue, we estimate the propensity score matching (PSM) in the first period to 
match the borrowers with the non-borrowers using a set of observed characteristics. The PSM creates a 
new panel dataset that consists of the borrower and non-borrower groups that are more comparable in 
terms of the observed characteristics than the original panel data. The comparison between the 
borrowers and non-borrowers is performed over a common support region with similar characteristics. 
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The purpose of this step is to remove the observed heterogeneity in the initial period before using the 
fixed effects (FE) model (see Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998).The observed characteristics including 
individual, household, village and commune factors in the covariates are documented in Table 1.    
 
Given the matched pre-program attributes from the PSM and program participation is exogenously 
defined, the program impact estimator can be obtained using equation (1):  
 
0 0it t it i it i itY D I uα δ µ φ ν′= + + + + +X       (1) 
 
where the program participation variable, itI , takes the value of 1 if the 
thi  household borrows 
microcredit in the post-program period and 0 otherwise. The parameter of interest, φ , is the impact 
estimator measuring the effect of the microcredit program on the outcome variables. Y  represents the 
outcomes of interest, which are household consumption or income in natural logarithm. iD is the 
program participation dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the thi  household belongs to the 
borrower group and 0 otherwise. tD is a time dummy variable which equals 1 for t=1 (post-program 
period) and 0 for t=0 (pre-program period). The coefficient 0δ captures the aggregate time influences on 
both groups. itX is a vector of households characteristics (e.g., age, gender, household size, etc.); µ
captures the effects of the observed covariates on the outcome for each time period, itv , is a time-
invariant unobserved error and itu is the idiosyncratic error. 
  
To account for the impact of microloan size on the outcomes, Nguyen (2008) shows that when the 
amount of a microloan ( ML ) replaces itI , the impact estimatorφ is interpreted as the impact of an 
additional amount of credit on the participant. In addition, the specification allows ML  to enter the FE 
model as an exogenous variable that indicates a possible correlation between the microloan and time-
invariant individual unobserved factors. The estimated model for a ML in the outcome equation is 
rewritten as follows:  
 
0 0it t it i it i itY D ML uα δ µ φ ν′= + + + + +X      (2) 
 
Unbiased estimators in equations (1) and (2) can be obtained using a FE model that is able to deal with 
the individual unobserved time invariant errors (Wooldridge, 2005). However, microcredit participation 
and microloan size are possibly endogenous in equations (1) and (2). Endogeneity is likely to occur if the 
assumption of unobserved factors at the household, village and commune levels does not remain fixed. 
For example, time varying unobserved factors of different microcredit schemes such as expanding 
lending coverage or a change in lending regulations that might jointly influence credit participation and 
microloan size at the borrowing period but also influence households’ consumption or income over a 
longer period of time. Households adjust credit demand and consumption according to such changes. If 
I and ML are not exogenously defined the households’ outcomes, e.g., households within the program 
villages self-select into the microcredit program which depends on differential unobserved trends, 
biased estimators are likely obtained from the standard FE models (1 and 2), respectively. Khandker 
(2005) suggests testing for endogeneity to detect whether the FE method is sufficient for the exogenous 




Table 1: Description of variables using VHLSS 2008 
  Borrowers  Non-borrowers 
Variables Description Mean S.D.   Mean S. D.  
1. Individual characteristics      
AGE Age of household head (years) 46.90 10.86  50.89 13.44 
GENDER Gender of household head 0.78 0.41  0.74 0.44 
ETHNIC Ethnic group (1= ethnic group, 0=Kinh)  3.31 5.49  1.88 3.52 
MARRIED Marital status (1=married, 0=otherwise) 0.86 0.35  0.81 0.39 
PRI_SCHO Head with primary school 0.01 0.07  0.01 0.08 
SEC_SCHO Head with secondary school 0.26 0.44  0.27 0.44 
HIG_SCHO Head with high school 0.33 0.47  0.29 0.45 
TEC_DEGRE Head with technical degree 0.10 0.30  0.14 0.35 
UNI_DEGRE Head with university degree 0.01 0.07  0.01 0.10 
POST_GRAD Head with post-grad degree 0.01 0.09  0.04 0.19 
2. Household characteristics      
HH_SIZE Household size  4.54 1.63  4.12 1.67 
R_FEMALE Ratio of female members 0.51 0.18  0.52 0.20 
R_BELOW16 Ratio of member below 16 0.26 0.21  0.22 0.21 
R_ABOVE60 Ratio of member above 60 0.06 0.14  0.14 0.27 
R_WAGRI Ratio of members working in agriculture 0.47 0.29  0.39 0.33 
R_WINDUS Ratio of members working in industry 0.28 0.25  0.25 0.26 
R_WSERV Ratio of members working in services 0.12 0.21  0.15 0.23 
R_PRI_SCHO Ratio of members with primary school 0.26 0.25  0.25 0.26 
R_SEC_SCHO Ratio of members with secondary school  0.26 0.26  0.24 0.26 
R_HIG_SCHO Ratio of members with high school  0.14 0.22  0.15 0.23 
R_UNI_DEGRE Ratio of members with tertiary education 0.01 0.05  0.03 0.12 
NUM_SDAYS No. of days off due to illness per member 7.15 6.48  6.67 6.19 
LAND_ACROP Area of annual crop land (m2) 4309.05 8685.75  3459.07 9890.42 
LAND_PCROP Area of perennial crop land (m2) 1538.86 11269.48  1270.29 6203.83 
LAND_WSURF Area of aquaculture water surface (m2) 195.25 1341.47  406.68 4598.76 
RE_OVERSEAS Overseas remittance (1,000 VND) 504.70 4533.89  1218.28 8815.66 
RE_DOMESTIC Domestic remittance (1,000 VND)  1605.16 3391.04  2460.80 7597.42 
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PENSION Pension (1,000 VND) 608.56 2861.87  1496.57 5655.33 
SAVINGS Savings (1,000VND) 37.75 426.46  656.57 9199.07 
POOR_CER Poor certified households 0.34 0.47  0.11 0.32 
3. Village and commune characteristics      
GEO_CSTAL Coastal area  0.07 0.26  0.07 0.25 
GEO_DELTA Delta 0.36 0.48  0.55 0.50 
GEO_MIDLAND Midland/hilly land  0.05 0.22  0.07 0.25 
GEO_LMOUNT Low mountainous areas 0.23 0.42  0.18 0.38 
GEO_HMOUNT High mountainous areas 0.29 0.45  0.13 0.34 
CR_COM Having car road commune  0.81 0.39  0.69 0.46 
DE_CENTER Distance to the nearest extension centre (km) 12.96 10.86  10.96 8.83 
NF_ENTER Having nonfarm enterprise commune 0.49 0.50  0.53 0.50 
TR_VILLA Having traditional-village commune 0.08 0.27  0.10 0.30 
CR_VILLA Having car road village  0.75 0.43  0.63 0.48 
4. Instrumental variables      
R_POVERY Poverty ratio by commune authority 0.24 0.17  0.16 0.14 
D_BANK Distance to the nearest bank (km)  9.19 3.24  7.80 2.67 
 Number of observations 556  3,571 
Source: The Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey in 2008, GSO. 
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To overcome the potential endogeneity, this study used two IVs, the commune poverty rate and the 
distance from village to the nearest bank, to test the endogeneity of ML in the program impact in 
equation (2). The commune poverty rate provides a correlation between microloans and the 
households’ criteria of program selection. The poverty rate of the commune is suggested to control for 
time invariant unobserved factors because it is one criterion that makes a microcredit program available 
to poor households. However, a commune that has a large number of poor households will have a large 
number of potential participants in the program. Nguyen (2008) argues that when there are many 
applicants applying for credit, credit groups and commune heads tend to screen the applicant list more 
carefully because they have the responsibility of ensuring the repayment rate of the borrowers. More 
applicants are likely to be excluded from the borrowing list. As a result, an eligible household that is in a 
commune with a large number of poor households is likely to face higher competition when borrowing 
from the program.  
 
The second IV is distance from a village where the households are located to the nearest bank. The 
nearest bank can be any commercial bank, including VBSP. However, the coverage of VBSP has been 
expanded to reach rural areas and many bank branches are often located close to each other in the 
commune centre. Households in a village that are closer to a VBSP branch are more likely to obtain 
microcredit more than distant households.  
 
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated using fixed effects models with the specified instruments. The 
estimated results are presented in Table 2 and 3. To obtain unbiased estimators, tests for under 
identification, endogeneity, weak identification and instrument-robust inference were conducted. The 
test results reported in Table 4 and 5 indicate that the models are not under identified. 
 
However, given the potential endogeneity problem in program participation and microloan size in 
equations (1) and (2), the test for endogeneity confirms that program participation and microloan were 
endogenously defined with consumption and income in the fixed effects model. Therefore, the 
instrumental variable fixed effects models (IV-FE) were used to obtain the unbiased estimators for the 
program and microloan impacts. The results of the first stage of the FE models show that only the 
“commune poverty rate” is negative and significantly correlated with credit participation at the 1% level, 
i.e., higher poverty ratio in the commune corresponds to lower participation in a microcredit program. 
High poverty rate implies that there are many eligible households residing in the area that has a 
microcredit program implemented. Thus, high poverty rate increases competition of being selected and 
reduces the chance of participation in the microcredit program. Controlling for the program 
endogeneity in our model, the IV-FE estimation can resolve the biased impact estimators (see Table 2).  
    
Although the IV can be significant on the endogenous variables, i.e., program participation and 
microloan size, they can be weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. The problem of weak 
identification causes the traditional two stage least square (2SLS) estimator to be inefficient and the 
inference from the estimates will not be reliable. Therefore, a test for weak identification of instruments 
is suggested using the Cragg-Donald statistic (Cragg & Donald, 1993; Stock & Yogo, 2002). The test 
results for weak identification of instruments indicate that the instruments are not weak for the 
Vietnam sample but rather weak for the MRD sample (see Tables 4 and 5). In addition, tests for 
instrument-robust inference are performed to assure the coefficients are able to be inferred under the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. The estimated results are obtained using the Generalised Method of 
Moment (GMM) with IV because the IV-GMM class allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity with smaller 




Table 2: Results for IV fixed effects models for VBSP microcredit impact on household per capita expenditure  
 First-Stage Regression   Second-Stage Regression 
      ln per capita Expenditure 
Variable Programme Amount of Formal Microcredit  Programme Amount of Formal Microcredit 
 The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam  The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam 
Participation in VBSP      2.1150*** 1.4140***   
      [0.6160] [0.1630]   
ln Formal Microcredit        0.3530** 0.3120*** 
        [0.1470] [0.0728] 
1. Individual factors          
AGE 0.0010 0.0029*** 0.0051 0.0124  -0.0015 0.0010 -0.0013 0.0013 
 [0.0014] [0.0010] [0.0119] [0.0111]  [0.0041] [0.0024] [0.0049] [0.0042] 
GENDER 0.1190 0.0112 0.8210 0.0535  -0.1070 -0.0528 -0.1450 -0.0532 
 [0.0830] [0.0519] [0.7540] [0.4650]  [0.2180] [0.0941] [0.2980] [0.148] 
ETHNIC -0.0066 0.0056 -0.2560* 0.0364  0.0210 -0.0199*** 0.0963 -0.0246* 
 [0.0237] [0.0056] [0.1440] [0.0573]  [0.0515] [0.0068] [0.0660] [0.0137] 
MARRIED -0.0355 0.0099 -0.3050 0.2540  0.0110 0.0848 0.0441 0.0148 
 [0.0444] [0.0350] [0.4490] [0.3670]  [0.1520] [0.0805] [0.2050] [0.1260] 
PRI_SCHO 0.0291 0.0209 0.3420 0.1430  -0.0787 0.0906 -0.1480 0.0849 
 [0.0517] [0.0639] [0.3700] [0.6450]  [0.2180] [0.1380] [0.2370] [0.2330] 
SEC_SCHO -0.0223 -0.0037 0.2250 -0.2990  0.0522 0.0768 -0.0758 0.1620* 
 [0.0429] [0.0257] [0.3550] [0.2610]  [0.1090] [0.0513] [0.1310] [0.0970] 
HIG_SCHO -0.1180 -0.0198 -0.7340 -0.2750  0.2420 0.0733 0.2480 0.1300 
 [0.0778] [0.0369] [0.7310] [0.3390]  [0.1960] [0.0666] [0.3050] [0.1150] 
TEC_DEGRE -0.1000 -0.1090** -0.1400 -0.5920  0.1330 0.1410 -0.0337 0.1700 
 [0.0686] [0.0475] [0.6520] [0.4330]  [0.2010] [0.0915] [0.2600] [0.1500] 
UNI_DEGRE -0.0381 0.0260 0.3030 -1.2650  0.4710*** 0.1450 0.2950 0.5990** 
 [0.0691] [0.0789] [0.5860] [1.0220]  [0.1590] [0.1670] [0.2190] [0.2790] 
POST_GRAD -0.0440 -0.2450** 0.7000 -1.4180  0.5470** 0.2730 0.2250 0.3810 
 [0.1000] [0.0953] [0.8540] [0.9370]  [0.2580] [0.1990] [0.3400] [0.3250] 
2. Household factors          
HHSIZE -0.0138 -0.0132* 0.0077 -0.0064  -0.0704** -0.0917*** -0.1040** -0.1100*** 
 [0.0131] [0.0069] [0.1270] [0.0789]  [0.0341] [0.0136] [0.0461] [0.0271] 
R_FEMALE 0.0076 0.0131 0.6160 0.2750  -0.4380* -0.0121 -0.6410* -0.0765 
 [0.1170] [0.0590] [0.9310] [0.6030]  [0.2580] [0.1170] [0.3610] [0.2050] 
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R_BELOW 16 0.0857 0.0037 0.8430 0.5850  -0.4330 -0.3780*** -0.5570 -0.5590*** 
 [0.1330] [0.0645] [1.1980] [0.570]  [0.2940] [0.1150] [0.4370] [0.1920] 
R_ABOVE 60 -0.0352 -0.0805 -0.9620 -0.7550  0.1280 0.1720 0.3990 0.2990 
 [0.0917] [0.0498] [0.9430] [0.4910]  [0.2390] [0.1200] [0.3540] [0.1920] 
R_WAGRI -0.0632 0.0012 -0.4620 -0.1160  0.0961 -0.0867 0.1220 -0.0486 
 [0.0651] [0.0310] [0.5670] [0.3040]  [0.1510] [0.0591] [0.2220] [0.1020] 
R_WINDUS 0.0756 0.0771** 0.0778 0.3850  -0.1860 0.0200 -0.0522 0.0082 
 [0.0597] [0.0376] [0.5510] [0.3600]  [0.1480] [0.0685] [0.1990] [0.1190] 
R_WSERV 0.0430 -0.0147 0.0516 0.0882  -0.1380 0.1280 -0.0688 0.08110 
 [0.0797] [0.0465] [0.6530] [0.4230]  [0.2060] [0.0898] [0.2520] [0.1470] 
R_PRI_SCHO 0.0345 -0.0127 0.7360 0.0735  0.00562 0.1460* -0.1800 0.1140 
 [0.0882] [0.0443] [0.7920] [0.4520]  [0.1860] [0.0843] [0.3080] [0.1540] 
R_SEC_SCHO 0.2280* 0.0585 1.8140 0.4480  -0.0628 0.1970* -0.2150 0.1560 
 [0.1250] [0.0568] [1.1230] [0.5630]  [0.3030] [0.1100] [0.5000] [0.1950] 
R_HIG_SCHO 0.1380 0.2690*** 0.0382 1.9520**  0.5030 0.2070 0.8060* -0.0080 
 [0.1220] [0.0704] [1.264] [0.731]  [0.3190] [0.1410] [0.4730] [0.2880] 
R_UNI_DEGRE 0.0818 0.3570* 0.4330 2.1180  -0.6230 0.2140 -0.5930 0.0849 
 [0.1390] [0.2080] [1.0130] [1.8920]  [0.4770] [0.3500] [0.5190] [0.6000] 
NUM_SDAYS -0.0037* -0.0010 -0.0101 -0.0062  0.0081* 0.0028 0.0036 0.0031 
 [0.0019] [0.0010] [0.0159] [0.0086]  [0.0047] [0.0017] [0.0057] [0.0028] 
LAND_ACROP 8.80e-08 8.63e-07 7.62e-08 7.18e-06  3.32e-06* 3.08e-06** 3.53e-06** 2.15e-06 
 [2.63e-07] [8.94e-07] [2.28e-06] [7.92e-06]  [1.76e-06] [1.57e-06] [1.79e-06] [2.43e-06] 
LAND_PCROP -1.63e-06 1.68e-06* 7.20e-06 9.77e-06  2.52e-05* 2.32e-07 1.95e-05 -7.73e-08 
 [7.55e-07] [9.73e-07] [3.36e-05] [9.41e-06]  [1.45e-05] [2.41e-06] [1.50e-05] [3.23e-06] 
LAND_WSURF -8.65e-07 4.43e-07 -1.22e-05* 6.51e-06  1.02e-05** 1.01e-05*** 1.25e-05*** 8.73e-06*** 
 [1.12e-07] [1.04e-06] [6.97e-06] [6.84e-06]  [3.99e-06] [2.97e-06] [3.54e-06] [3.26e-06] 
RE_OVERSEAS -1.19e-07 -8.04e-07 -1.64e-05 -8.02e-06  7.25e-06 2.97e-06** 1.06e-05 4.41e-06** 
 [1.80e-07] [7.03e-07] [1.49e-05] [6.49e-06]  [5.49e-06] [1.23e-06] [7.25e-06] [2.20e-06] 
RE_DOMESTIC 9.23e-07 -6.23e-07 -1.51e-05 -4.63e-06  2.32e-05*** 1.31e-05*** 3.03e-05*** 1.37e-05*** 
 [2.08e-06] [5.81e-07] [2.17e-05] [4.47e-06]  [4.86e-06] [3.36e-06] [8.20e-06] [3.71e-06] 
PENSSION -9.26e-06 -6.56e-06** -8.97e-05 -5.56e-05  4.12e-05** 1.56e-05** 5.40e-05** 2.40e-05* 
 [8.09e-06] [2.76e-06] [6.66e-05] [3.46e-05]  [1.61e-06] [6.15e-06] [2.40e-05] [1.27e-05] 
SAVINGS -2.40e-06 -1.14e-06 -7.90e-06 -3.81e-06  2.56e-05** 1.64e-05*** 2.38e-05 1.65e-05*** 
 [3.76e-06] [9.29e-07] [3.78e-05] [8.35e-06]  [1.24e-05] [4.56e-06] [1.69e-05] [5.62e-06] 
POOR_CER -0.0365 0.0502 0.2960 0.6150**  -0.0311 -0.1410** -0.2160 -0.2620** 
 [0.0746] [0.0325] [0.7270] [0.3130]  [0.1630] [0.0533] [0.2440] [0.1090] 
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3. Village and commune 
CR_COMMUNE 0.0038 0.0345 -0.3820 -0.2300  0.0662 0.1170 0.2150 0.2530 
 [0.0617] [0.0681] [0.5510] [0.4980]  [0.1410] [0.0998] [0.1980] [0.1460] 
DE_CENTER -0.0075** -0.00361** -0.0693** -0.0265*  0.0102 0.0009 0.0189* 0.0034* 
 [0.0032] [0.0017] [0.0268] [0.0151]  [0.0074] [0.0027] [0.0113] [0.0052] 
NF_ENTER 0.0297 -0.0022 0.0187 -0.2850*  -0.0591 0.0904*** -0.0054 0.1740*** 
 [0.0395] [0.0177] [0.3610] [0.1680]  [0.0990] [0.0320] [0.1300] [0.0590] 
TR_VILLA -0.0110 0.0229 0.5010* 0.2840  0.0410 -0.0342 -0.1520 -0.0929 
 [0.0378] [0.0265] [0.2720] [0.2450]  [0.1010] [0.0485] [0.1360] [0.0818] 
CR_VILLA 0.0367 0.0242 0.8480** 0.3320  0.0335 -0.0596 -0.1800 -0.1190 
 [0.0473] [0.0258] [0.4120] [0.2600]  [0.1120] [0.0507] [0.2080] [0.0931] 
Regional dummy          
GEO_CSTAL  -0.2220**  -0.3910   0.1920  0.3330 
  [0.1100]  [1.0750]   [0.1570]  [0.3010] 
GEO_DELTA  -0.2420**  0.5450   0.1270  0.1070 
  [0.1160]  [1.1040]   [0.1170]  [0.2240] 
GEO_MIDLAND  -0.1780*  0.4910   -0.0594  -0.0240 
  [0.0998]  [0.9550]   [0.0977]  [0.1920] 
GEO_LMOUNT  -0.1580*  0.2340   0.1290  0.1930 
  [0.0844]  [0.7960]   [0.0807]  [0.1570] 
4. Instrumental variables          
D_NBANK 0.0307 -0.0239** 0.2260 0.0683      
 [0.0272] [0.0105] [0.2120] [0.0972]      
R_POVERTY -0.8520*** -0.8000*** -4.5710** -3.2730***      
 [0.2360] [0.0886] [2.1290] [0.7500]      
Number of observations 1,052 5,096 1,052 5,096  1,052 5,096 1,052 5,096 
Note: 1. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 
2.*, **, and *** indicate significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3: Results of IV fixed effects models for VBSP microcredit impact on household per capita income 
 
 First-Stage Regression  Second-Stage Regression 
      ln per capita income 
Variable Programme Amount of Formal 
Microcredit 
 Programme Amount of Formal Microcredit 
 The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam  The MRD Vietnam The MRD Vietnam 
Participation in VBSP      1.6660** 0.8370***   
      [0.5830] [0.1350]   
ln Formal Microcredit        0.2540** 0.1620*** 
        [0.1290] [0.0459] 
1. Individual factors          
AGE 0.0007 0.0028*** 0.0035 0.0120  0.0010 0.0006 0.0013 0.0012 
 [0.0013] [0.0010] [0.0118] [0.0111]  [0.0040] [0.0026] [0.0044] [0.0033] 
GENDER 0.1090 0.0117 0.7350 0.0580  0.0397 0.0604 0.0309 0.0592 
 [0.0814] [0.0518] [0.7410] [0.4650]  [0.2320] [0.0850] [0.2740] [0.1040] 
ETHNIC -0.0057 0.0057 -0.2480* 0.0369  0.0843 -0.0116 0.1370* -0.0137 
 [0.0241] [0.0056] [0.1470] [0.0574]  [0.0700] [0.0088] [0.0805] [0.0115] 
MARRIED -0.0299 0.0096 -0.2580 0.2510  -0.0845 0.0210 -0.0645 -0.0129 
 [0.0437] [0.0349] [0.4400] [0.3660]  [0.1730] [0.0772] [0.2000] [0.0944] 
PRI_SCHO 0.0287 0.0208 0.3390 0.1420  0.0102 -0.0372 -0.0403 -0.0371 
 [0.0506] [0.0639] [0.3640] [0.6460]  [0.1920] [0.1100] [0.1870] [0.1490] 
SEC_SCHO -0.0260 -0.0047 0.1940 -0.3080  0.1510 0.0386 0.0562 0.0838 
 [0.0427] [0.0256] [0.3530] [0.2610]  [0.1060] [0.0458] [0.1150] [0.0664] 
HIG_SCHO -0.1180 -0.0202 -0.7350 -0.2780  0.3340* 0.0600 0.3200 0.0880 
 [0.0773] [0.0368] [0.7280] [0.3390]  [0.1770] [0.0587] [0.2440] [0.0771] 
TEC_DEGRE -0.0949 -0.1080** -0.0965 -0.5850  0.2460 0.1230 0.1060 0.1260 
 [0.0684] [0.0475] [0.6500] [0.4330]  [0.2080] [0.0877] [0.2330] [0.1060] 
UNI_DEGRE -0.0331 0.0265 0.3450 -1.2600  0.1720 0.1630 0.0420 0.4050 
 [0.0685] [0.0789] [0.5810] [1.0190]  [0.2790] [0.1840] [0.2970] [0.2560] 
POST_GRAD -0.0466 -0.2450** 0.6790 -1.4160  1.3010*** 0.1860 1.0690*** 0.2200 
 [0.0998] [0.0954] [0.8490] [0.9370]  [0.3360] [0.1820] [0.3530] [0.2340] 
2. Household factors          
HHSIZE -0.0146 -0.0133* 0.00123 -0.0071  -0.0552* -0.0889*** -0.0819** -0.1000*** 
 [0.0130] [0.0069] [0.1260] [0.0788]  [0.0303] [0.0124] [0.0372] [0.0179] 
R_FEMALE 0.0273 0.0180 0.7810 0.3150  -0.6120** -0.1200 -0.7690** -0.1550 
 [0.1160] [0.0589] [0.9150] [0.6010]  [0.2420] [0.1060] [0.3040] [0.1390] 
13 
 
R_BELOW 16 0.0365 -0.0063 0.4320 0.5030  -0.5230* -0.3650*** -0.5820 -0.4560*** 
 [0.1250] [0.0639] [1.1400] [0.5660]  [0.2720] [0.1020] [0.3430] [0.1290] 
R_ABOVE 60 -0.0455 -0.0822* -1.0480 -0.7700  0.0333 0.0101 0.2340 0.0700 
 [0.0909] [0.0498] [0.9370] [0.4910]  [0.240] [0.1130] [0.2990] [0.1420] 
R_WAGRI -0.0888 -0.00436 -0.6750 -0.1620  0.1890 -0.0217 0.2100 0.0002 
 [0.0616] [0.0306] [0.5450] [0.3020]  [0.1460] [0.0533] [0.1950] [0.0677] 
R_WINDUS 0.0723 0.0756** 0.0504 0.3720  0.1040 0.3200*** 0.2140 0.3230*** 
 [0.0593] [0.0376] [0.5490] [0.3590]  [0.1500] [0.0587] [0.1730] [0.0781] 
R_WSERV 0.1030* -0.0021 0.5500 0.1930  0.0909 0.3770*** 0.1200 0.3440*** 
 [0.0580] [0.0454] [0.4750] [0.4160]  [0.1880] [0.0805] [0.2020] [0.1000] 
R_PRI_SCHO 0.0439 -0.0101 0.8150 0.0958  0.0207 0.1850** -0.1120 0.1650 
 [0.0878] [0.0442] [0.7850] [0.4520]  [0.1830] [0.0786] [0.2680] [0.1060] 
R_SEC_SCHO 0.2380* 0.0591 1.8990* 0.4530  0.1110 0.2110** 0.03210 0.1980 
 [0.1230] [0.0568] [1.1130] [0.5630]  [0.2950] [0.1040] [0.4290] [0.1320] 
R_HIG_SCHO 0.1440 0.2680*** 0.0938 1.9470***  0.3220 0.1580 0.5680 0.0770 
 [0.1200] [0.0704] [1.2490] [0.7310]  [0.3290] [0.1320] [0.4050] [0.1940] 
R_UNI_DEGRE 0.1280 0.3590* 0.8180 2.1380  -1.5380** 0.3360 -1.5200** 0.3110 
 [0.1370] [0.2080] [0.9770] [1.8920]  [0.7280] [0.3480] [0.7420] [0.4150] 
NUM_SDAYS -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0043 -0.00508  0.0014 0.0006 -0.0027 0.0005 
 [0.0018] [0.0010] [0.0151] [0.00857]  [0.0042] [0.0015] [0.0045] [0.0019] 
LAND_ACROP 8.43e-08 8.57e-07 4.49e-08 7.13e-06  1.28e-05*** 1.16e-05*** 1.30e-05*** 1.12e-05*** 
 [2.61e-07] [8.91e-07] [2.38e-06] [7.89e-06]  [2.36e-06] [1.89e-06] [2.43e-06] [2.18e-06] 
LAND_PCROP -1.49e-06 1.68e-06* 8.36e-06 9.79e-06  2.77e-05* 2.44e-06 2.33e-05* 2.54e-06 
 [7.53e-06] [9.74e-07] [3.38e-05] [9.43e-06]  [1.67e-05] [2.67e-06] [1.21e-05] [2.06e-06] 
LAND_WSURF -1.07e-06 2.40e-07 -1.39e-05** 4.82e-06  5.26e-06 5.64e-06 6.99e-06* 5.11e-06 
 [1.19e-06] [1.07e-06] [6.84e-06] [6.83e-06]  [4.07e-06] [3.68e-06] [4.03e-06] [3.73e-06] 
RE_OVERSEAS -1.28e-06 -7.95e-07 -1.71e-05 -7.94e-06  1.47e-05*** 1.43e-05*** 1.69e-05** 1.49e-05*** 
 [1.80e-06] [7.01e-07] [1.50e-05] [6.47e-06]  [5.47e-06] [1.44e-06] [6.94e-06] [1.58e-06] 
RE_DOMESTIC 6.35e-07 -6.31e-07 -1.75e-05 -4.69e-06  2.21e-05*** 1.73e-05*** 2.74e-05*** 1.76e-05*** 
 [2.05e-06] [5.82e-07] [2.14e-05] [4.50e-06]  [5.69e-06] [2.54e-06] [7.26e-06] [2.70e-06] 
PENSSION -8.84e-06* -6.61e-07** -8.62e-05 -5.60e-05  6.66e-05*** 2.41e-05*** 7.47e-05*** 2.79e-05*** 
 [8.05e-06] [2.76e-06] [6.64e-05] [3.45e-05]  [1.38e-05] [5.40e-06] [1.90e-05] [7.86e-06] 
SAVINGS -2.36e-06 -1.14e-07 -7.52e-06 -3.82e-06  1.34e-05 1.64e-05*** 1.21e-05 1.65e-05*** 
 [3.72e-06] [9.32e-07] [3.75e-05] [8.34e-06]  [9.32e-06] [4.53e-06] [1.22e-05] [5.00e-06] 
POOR_CER -0.0396 0.0504 0.2700 0.6170**  0.0199 -0.1540*** -0.1190 -0.2120*** 
 [0.0743] [0.0325] [0.7280] [0.3120]  [0.1470] [0.0475] [0.1980] [0.0722] 
 
 
         
14 
 
3. Village and commune 
CR_COMMUNE 0.0052 0.0345 -0.3710 -0.2310  0.1160 0.1150 0.2300 0.1940* 
 [0.0607] [0.0679] [0.5450] [0.4960]  [0.1460] [0.1020] [0.1780] [0.1140] 
DE_CENTER -0.0075** -0.0036* -0.0693*** -0.0265*  -0.0075 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0020 
 [0.0032] [0.0017] [0.0267] [0.0151]  [0.0069] [0.0026] [0.0100] [0.00345] 
NF_ENTER 0.0292 -0.0021 0.0147 -0.2850*  0.0374 0.0831*** 0.0817 0.1270*** 
 [0.0395] [0.0177] [0.3600] [0.1680]  [0.0950] [0.0265] [0.1100] [0.0374] 
TR_VILLA -0.0123 0.0233 0.4900* 0.2870  0.0566 -1.11e-05 -0.0807 -0.0286 
 [0.0375] [0.0265] [0.2660] [0.2450]  [0.1030] [0.0406] [0.1240] [0.0521] 
CR_VILLA 0.0364 0.0242 0.8460** 0.3320  -0.0128 -0.0367 -0.1600 -0.0627 
 [0.0475] [0.0258] [0.4120] [0.2600]  [0.1130] [0.0435] [0.1830] [0.0616] 
Regional dummy          
GEO_CSTAL  -0.2210**  -0.3800   -0.0633  0.0040 
  [0.1110]  [1.0760]   [0.1340]  [0.1800] 
GEO_DELTA  -0.2390**  0.5690   -0.0785  -0.0896 
  [0.1160]  [1.1050]   [0.0914]  [0.1330] 
GEO_MIDLAND  -0.1760*  0.5120   -0.1840**  -0.1620 
  [0.0997]  [0.9550]   [0.0781]  [0.1170] 
GEO_LMOUNT  -0.1570*  0.2500   0.0274  0.0619 
  [0.0843]  [0.7960]   [0.0607]  [0.0937] 
4. Instrumental variables          
D_NBANK 0.0323 -0.0236** 0.2390 0.0702      
 [0.0272] [0.0105] [0.2110] [0.0972]      
R_POVERTY -0.8200*** -0.7980*** -4.2970** -3.2530***      
 [0.2320] [0.0885] [2.1060] [0.7500]      
Number of observations 1,050 5,094 1,050 5,094  1,050 5,094 1,050 5,094 
Note: 1. Robust Standard Errors are in the brackets 





Table 4: Tests for underindentification, endogeneity, weak Instruments, and weak instrument-robust inference for IV fixed effects models 
using the Vietnam sample 
 IV Equation Consumption Equation  Income Equation 
1. Underidentification test  Programme Chi2(2) = 88.09***  Chi2(3) = 87.69*** 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
 Microcredit Chi2(2) = 19.25***  Chi2(2) = 19.09*** 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
2. Test of endogeneity  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Programme Chi2(1) =111.81*** 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) =42.08*** 
p-value = 0.000 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Microcredit Chi2(1) =116.63*** 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) =39.49*** 
p-value = 0.000 
3. Weak IV identification test: Programme    
Cragg-Donald F statistic  43.27  43.08 
 Microcredit    
Cragg-Donald F statistic   9.76   9.68 
4. Weak instrument-robust inference Programme Chi2(2)=139.53***  Chi2(2)=64.47*** 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Microcredit p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
Note: 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% that Ho is not true, respectively. 
2. Critical values for the Weak IV identification tests are based on Stock and Yogo (2005) tables. 
- Given the desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS estimator (5%), Cragg-Donald F statistics reject Ho of Weak IV identification  at the 
5% level for  IV fixed effect models of programme impact on the consumption and income equations.  
- Given the desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS estimator (20%), Cragg-Donald F statistics reject Ho of Weak IV identification at the 








Table 5: Tests for underidentification, endogeneity, weak Instruments and weak instrument-robust inference for IV fixed effects models 
using the MRD sample  
 IV Equation Consumption Equation  Income Equation 
1. Underidentification test  Programme Chi2(2) = 15.53***  Chi2(3) = 14.86*** 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
 Microcredit Chi2(2) = 6.40**  Chi2(2) = 5.85* 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic  p-value = 0.041  p-value = 0.054 
2. Test of endogeneity  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Programme Chi2(1) = 33.85*** 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) = 19.87*** 
p-value = 0.000 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic 
Microcredit Chi2(1) = 35.95*** 
p-value = 0.000 
 Chi2(1) = 19.31*** 
p-value = 0.000 
3. Weak IV identification test: Programme    
Cragg-Donald F statistic  7.27  6.80 
 Microcredit    
Cragg-Donald F statistic  2.97  2.80 
4. Weak instrument-robust inference Programme Chi2(2)= 51.78***  Chi2(2)= 35.16*** 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Microcredit p-value = 0.000  p-value = 0.000 
Note: 1.  *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1% that Ho is not true, respectively. 
           2. Critical values for the Weak IV identification tests are based on Stock and Yogo (2005) tables. 
               Given the desired maximal bias of IV estimator relative to OLS estimator (5%),  Cragg-Donald F statistics do not reject Ho of Weak IV identification  at 




3 Results and discussion 
 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the estimated results of the four IV-FE models for microcredit impact on 
household consumption and income (only the significant variables in each model were reported). 
Each table has two sets of results, one for the MRD and another for Vietnam. The first set includes 
the results of the microcredit program impact on household consumption (model E1) and microloan 
size impact on household consumption (model E2) using the MRD sample and likewise for household 
income (models I1 and I2). The last two columns are the results of the microcredit program impact 
(model E3) and microloan size impact (model E4) using the Vietnam sample and similarly for 
household income (models I3 and I4). The per capita expenditure and income in real terms are used 
to measure household consumption and income in the models, respectively1. The IV coefficients 
were estimated in the first stage regression but for the purpose of identifying the impact 
coefficients, the IV will also be discussed. Since the estimated results (models E1, E2, and I1, I2) for 
the MRD are subject to weak instrument identification, the estimated results (models E3, E4 and I3, 
I4) for Vietnam are mainly discussed. Unless otherwise stated, all explanatory variables are discussed 
using the results of the IV fixed effects models (E3 and I3) for the program impact. Given that the 
determinants of consumption and income are identified, the treatment variables - microcredit 
program and microloan size are discussed for the average treatment on the treated (ATT) and the 
average treatment of additional microloan amount on the treated (ATTM), respectively.    
 
3.1 Impact of VBSP microcredit on household per capita consumption 
 
Table 6 summarizes the factors in estimating the impact of VPSB microcredit on the household per 
capita consumption in the MRD and Vietnam. For individual factors, ETHNICITY is not significant in 
the MRD but significant at the 1% level in Vietnam. This implies that household heads belonging to 
an ethnic group have a lower per capita consumption than the main ethnic group. Different 
ethnicities contribute a 2% difference in household expenditure across the country but not for the 
MRD.  
 
Among the household factors in four models, HHSIZE, R_BELOW16, R_PRI_SCHO, R_SEC_SCHO, 
LAND_ACROP, LAND_WSURF, RE_OVERSEAS, RE_DOMESTIC, PENSSION, SAVINGS, and POOR_CER 
significantly explain household expenditure. The negative coefficients of HHSIZE and R_BELOW16 
are significant at the 1% level. Household size and number of household members below 16 years 
old are negatively correlated with the per capita expenditure. An increase in family members in a 
household significantly reduces 10% of per capita expenditure whereas an increase of 10 percentage 
points of the ratio of members below 16 years old decreases per capita expenditure by 5%. The 
coefficient POOR_CER is negatively significant at the 5% level, which indicates that poor certified 
households have less per capita consumption than non-poor households. Given a large family size 
with a high ratio of household members below 16 years old, poor certified household per capita 
expenditure is 24.6% less than the non-poor households (see Table 6).   
 
The coefficients R_PRI_SCHO and R_SEC_SCHO are both positive and significant at the 10% and 5% 
level, respectively. The results show that the expenses related to primary and secondary schooling 
are important expenditures. Households with children in primary and secondary school require 
14.5% and 19.7% more spending, respectively. The results reflect the common spending pattern in 
the Vietnamese households where spending on education takes an important share of the 
household budget because most Vietnamese families expects a high return from their children’s 
education (Doan, 2011).  
                                                          
1 To obtain the real term, first nominal data were adjusted for monthly price changes over the survey periods 
and then regional price differences over each survey. Next, the annual CPI was used to align the survey data to 




Table 6: Summary of fixed effects estimations for household per capita expenditure 
 
 The MRD  Vietnam 
 ln per capita 
Expenditure 
(E1) 
ln per capita 
Expenditure 
(E2) 
 ln per capita 
Expenditure 
(E3) 
ln per capita 
Expenditure 
(E4) 
Impact estimators      
Participation in VBSP 2.1150***   1.4140***  
ln Microloan  0.3530**   0.3120*** 
Individual factors      
ETHNICITY 0.0210 0.0963  -0.0199*** -0.0246* 
SEC_SCHO 0.0522 -0.0758  0.0768 0.1620* 
UNI_DEGRE 0.4710*** 0.2950  0.1450 0.5990** 
POST_GRAD 0.5470** 0.2250  0.2730 0.3810 
Household factors      
HHSIZE -0.0704** -0.1040**  -0.0917*** -0.1100*** 
R_FEMALE -0.4380* -0.6410*  -0.0121 -0.0765 
R_BELOW 16 -0.4330 -0.5570  -0.3780*** -0.5590*** 
R_PRI_SCHO 0.00562 -0.1800  0.1460* 0.1140 
R_SEC_SCHO -0.0628 -0.2150  0.1970* 0.1560 
R_HIG_SCHO 0.5030 0.8060*  0.2070 -0.0080 
NUM_SDAYS 0.0081* 0.0036  0.0028 0.0031 
LAND_ACROP 3.32e-06* 3.53e-06**  3.08e-06** 2.15e-06 
LAND_PCROP 2.52e-05* 1.95e-05  2.32e-07 -7.73e-08 
LAND_WSURF 1.02e-05** 1.25e-05***  1.01e-05*** 8.73e-06*** 
RE_OVERSEAS 7.25e-06 1.06e-05  2.97e-06** 4.41e-06** 
RE_DOMESTIC 2.32e-05*** 3.03e-05***  1.31e-05*** 1.37e-05*** 
PENSSION 4.12e-05** 5.40e-05**  1.56e-05** 2.40e-05* 
SAVINGS 2.56e-05** 2.38e-05  1.64e-05*** 1.65e-05*** 
POOR_CER -0.0311 -0.2160  -0.1410** -0.2620** 
Village and commune      
DE_CENTER 0.0102 0.0189*  0.0009 0.0034* 
NF_ENTER -0.0591 -0.0054  0.0904*** 0.1740*** 
Instrumental variables      
D_NBANK 0.0307 0.2260  -0.0239** 0.0683 
R_POVERTY -0.8520*** -4.5710**  -0.8000*** -3.2730*** 
Number of observations 1,052 1,052  5,096 5,096 
Notes: 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
2. The coefficients of instrumental variables are estimated in the first stage.  
 
The coefficients LAND_ACROP and LAND_WSURF are positive and significant at the 5% and 1% levels 
(in models I2 and I3), respectively. This suggests that annual crop land and areas of water surface for 
aquaculture positively increases the household per capita expenditure. Similarly, RE_OVERSEAS, 
PENSSION, RE_DOMESTIC, and SAVINGS are positive and significant at 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. This indicates that household per capita expenditure is supported by overseas 
remittances, domestic remittances, pensions, and savings. The remittances (money and goods) sent 
back home by overseas migrant workers have a profound impact on the living standards of people in 
developing countries (Adams &Page, 2005). The overseas and domestic remittance coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Overseas remittances suggest an external source of money 
sent from family members working or living overseas to support household consumption in Vietnam. 
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On the other hand, RE_DOMESTIC is positive and significant at the 1% level, which indicates that 
domestic remittances from family members working away from home largely support household 
spending, particularly rural households. International remittances reflect the economic relationship 
between high income and low income countries and the internal remittances suggest a wage 
discrepancy and job opportunities between the rural and urban areas in a country. Our results reveal 
a greater weight in domestic remittances over overseas sources in the determinants of household 
consumption in rural Vietnam.  In addition, pensions and savings coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (see Table 6).  
 
The coefficient of the variable related to the commune having non-farm enterprises (NF_ENTER) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. This means having non-farm enterprises located in the 
commune significantly contributes to the household consumption. This finding is consistent with 
Lanjouw and Lanjouw’s study (2001) which emphasises that the non-farm sector potentially absorbs 
a growing rural labor force in slowing down rural-urban migration and improves equitable income 
distribution. Similarly, Oostendorp, Trung, and Tung (2009) show non-farm enterprises play an 
important role in increasing income and reducing income inequality in Vietnam (see Table 6).  
  
The two IVs, D_BANK and R_POVERTY are negative and significant at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively (see Table 1). The results indicate that the ratio of poverty rate at the commune and 
distance to the nearest bank are negatively correlated with credit accessibility. The result confirms 
that a higher poverty ratio reduces the possibility of being selected in a microcredit program. The 
findings are consistent with Nguyen’s (2008) finding in Vietnam that shows a negative relationship of 
the two IVs. Thus, they are significantly valid IVs for microcredit impact in our study.  
 
The impact estimator for household per capita expenditure is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
This indicates that the VBSP microcredit program significantly helps increase the participants’ 
consumption in Vietnam. The result reconfirms the positive impact of a microcredit program on the 
consumption indicator of welfare. Our finding is consistent with a number studies on microcredit 
such as Pitt and Khandker (1998), Mosley (2001), Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008), and Islam 
(2011), among others. Particularly, the result is consistent with Nguyen’s (2008) study in Vietnam 
and it also supports the empirical findings of microcredit impact in Bangladesh (Khandker, 2005). 
 
3.2 Impact of VBSP microcredit on household per capita income 
 
Table 7 summarizes the significant factors in the income models (I1, I2, I3, and I4). The result shows 
that only the UNI_DEGRE coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that 
the household head with a university degree significantly increases the household income level by as 
much as 50%. The result is consistent with Doan and John’s (2010) finding that the trend of returns 
on education increased sharply after Vietnam’s economic transition and the returns to education 
reached a peak that significantly contributes to income growth.    
 
In terms of the household factors, HH_SIZE, R_BELOW16, and POOR_CER are negative and 
significant at the 1% level in model I3 and I4. In addition, R_WINDUS, R_WSERV, LAND_ACROP, 
RE_OVERSEAS, RE_DOMESTIC, PENSION, and SAVINGS are significant at the 1% level. The result 
shows the number of household members working in the industry and services are positive and 
significant at the 1% level in the income model but insignificant in the consumption model. The 
results indicate that households with members working in the industry or service sectors 
significantly increase their per capita income. This result strongly supports the trend of the shifting 
of labor supply in agriculture to the other sectors since the mid-1990s. The main reasons are 
documented in Haughton, Haughton, and Phong (2001) where the share of hired farm workers 
without annual cropland was only 55% of the agriculture work and that landless households were 
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forced to work outside the agriculture sector. The share of workers in the agriculture sector has 
been declining. As a result, non-agricultural income significantly contributes to total rural household 
income while the bulk of poor and low income households are self-employed farmers.  
 
Table 7: Summary of IV fixed effects estimations for household per capita income 
 
  The MRD  Vietnam 
  ln per capita 
Income 
(I1) 
ln per capita 
Income 
(I2) 
 ln per capita 
Income 
(I3) 
ln per capita 
Income 
(I4) 
Impact estimators       
Participation in VBSP   1.6660**    0.8370***  
ln Microloan    0.2540**    0.1620*** 
Individual factors       
ETHNICITY   0.0843  0.1370*  -0.0116 -0.0137 
HIG_SCHO   0.3340*  0.3200   0.0600  0.0880 
POST_GRAD   1.3010***  1.0690***   0.1860  0.2200 
Household factors       
HHSIZE  -0.0552* -0.0819**  -0.0889*** -0.1000*** 
R_FEMALE  -0.6120** -0.7690**  -0.1200 -0.1550 
R_BELOW 16  -0.5230* -0.5820  -0.3650*** -0.4560*** 
R_WINDUS   0.1040  0.2140   0.3200***  0.3230*** 
R_WSERV   0.0909  0.1200   0.3770***  0.3440*** 
R_PRI_SCHO   0.0207 -0.1120   0.1850**  0.1650 
R_SEC_SCHO   0.1110  0.03210   0.2110**  0.1980 
R_UNI_DEGRE  -1.5380** -1.5200**   0.3360  0.3110 
LAND_ACROP   1.28e-05***  1.30e-05***   1.16e-05***  1.12e-05*** 
LAND_PCROP   2.77e-05*  2.33e-05*   2.44e-06  2.54e-06 
LAND_WSURF   5.26e-06  6.99e-06*   5.64e-06  5.11e-06 
RE_OVERSEAS   1.47e-05***  1.69e-05**   1.43e-05***  1.49e-05*** 
RE_DOMESTIC   2.21e-05***  2.74e-05***   1.73e-05***  1.76e-05*** 
PENSSION   6.66e-05***  7.47e-05***   2.41e-05***  2.79e-05*** 
SAVINGS   1.34e-05  1.21e-05   1.64e-05***  1.65e-05*** 
POOR_CER   0.0199 -0.1190  -0.1540*** -0.2120*** 
Village and commune       
CR_COMMUNE   0.1160  0.2300   0.1150  0.1940* 
NF_ENTER   0.0374  0.0817   0.0831***  0.1270*** 
GEO_MIDLAND     -0.1840** -0.1620 
Instrumental variables       
D_NBANK   0.0323  0.2390  -0.0236**  0.0702 
R_POVERTY  -0.8200*** -4.2970**  -0.7980*** -3.2530*** 
Number of observations  1,050 1,050  5,094 5,094 
Notes: 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
2. The coefficients of instrumental variables are estimated in the first stage. 
 
There are some notable differences between the results from the MRD and Vietnam as a whole (see 
Table 7). First, the ETHNIC coefficients have mixed signs, which show an inconsistent relationship 
between ethnicity and income. Ethnicity is positively significant at the 10% level in model I2 and 
positive but insignificant in model I1, and it is negative and insignificant in the other models (I3 and 
I4). The results imply that ethnicity is not significantly correlated with household income in the MRD 
where there are few numbers of ethnic minorities such as Khmer, Chinese and Cham whose income 
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levels are not significantly different. However, when ethnicity is investigated at the national level 
with a wider range of ethnic minorities with different geographic and economic conditions from 
mountainous and remote areas, the impact exhibits an inverse relationship. The finding is consistent 
with Nguyen, Albrecht, Vroman, and Westbrook’s (2007) findings that show ethnicity is one of the 
determinants of income gaps. In addition, the coefficient of geographic factors is negative and 
significant at the 1% level for mid land and hilly land areas. If we consider the MRD only, geographic 
factors do not vary but geographic effects become significant at the national level. The result 
indicates that lower income is closely related to mid land or hilly land areas across the country.  
  
The R_PRI_SCHO and R_SEC_SCHOO coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level. The 
result indicates that the households tend to spend 18.5% for children to attend primary school and 
21.1% to attend secondary school in Vietnam (see Table 7). The number of household members in 
school can have an inverse effect if more household resources have been used for their children to 
obtain higher education.  For example, the negative and significant coefficients of R_UNI_DEGRE are 
reported in models I1 and I2. This is expected because more household members engaging in higher 
education level uses more household resources but contributes less to per capita income.  
 
The two IVs variables, D_NBANK and R-POVERTY are negative and significant at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. However, D_NBANK is negative and significant in both E3 and I3 (see Table 6 and 7) but 
is positive and insignificant in the rest of the models. The inconsistency may arise from missing data 
at the commune level because of mismatched communes from merging the commune and 
household datasets. Some communes in the VHLSS survey data for commune were not interviewed 
in the same VHLSS surveys for households. As a result, D_NBANK is a valid instrument for the credit 
participation at the national level but may be invalid for the microloan and the MRD models. In 
addition, as pointed out by Nguyen (2008), the distance from a village where the households are 
located to the nearest bank does not guarantee that the branch bank is a VBSP branch; the nearest 
bank can be any commercial bank, including VBSP. The distance is probably an inaccurate proxy for 
many observations. Moreover, the coverage of the VBSP microcredit program has been expanded 
over time. Increased lending to groups has been organised in villages where microcredit groups can 
be formed by credit group members with the presence of village heads or local authorities rather 
than lending to individuals at the VBSP branch. Therefore, the time varying effects could possibly 
make this variable an inappropriate proxy for VBSP credit availability in the current context. 
 
The impact estimator for household per capita income is positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
result confirms the positive impact of microcredit programs on household income. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Zaman (1999), Sarangi (2007) and Nguyen (2008), but contradicts 
Coleman’s study (2006) which shows an ambiguous impact of a microcredit program on income 
indicators in Thailand.     
 
Table 8 compares the impacts of microcredit program participation and microloan size between the 
MRD and Vietnam as a whole. Both impact estimators are positive and significant. This finding 
suggests two important points: 1) participation in a microcredit program has benefited the target 
households and 2) the marginal effect of microloan size significantly contributed to either household 
consumption or income. There appears to be a large difference in the magnitude of the impacts 
between MRD and Vietnam as a whole, provided that endogeneity has been significantly controlled 
for in the models. Microcredit has a greater impact in the MRD in terms of both income and 





Table 8: Summary of impact estimators of VBSP microcredit program using IV-FE models 
 
 The MRD  Vietnam 
Impact variable ln per capita 
Expenditure  
ln per capita 
Income  
 ln per capita 
Expenditure  
ln per capita 
Income 
Program participation  2.1146*** 1.6659***  1.4140*** 0.8369*** 
 [0.6159] [0.5835]  [ 0.1629] [0.1351]    
Microloan (1,000 dong) 0.3531** 0.2543**  0.3116*** 0.1629*** 
 [0.1473] [0.1294]  [0.0738] [0.0488] 
Number of observations 1,052 1,050  5,096 5,094 
Notes: 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Robust S.E. (with sampling weight error corrected) are in brackets.                        
 
The impact estimators are significant at the 1% level, while the MRD impact estimators of microloan 
on consumption and income are significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The significantly 
high magnitude of the MRD impact estimators at lower significance levels is largely due to two 
possibilities. First is the smaller sample size of MRD that produces larger variances of the impact 
estimators in the model. Another possibility can be explained based on Morduch’s (1998) claim 
about the weak instrument identification problem. The instruments are supposed to pick up any 
systematic heterogeneity such as land ownership, entrepreneurial skills, etc., that may correlate 
with program participation. However, weak instrument identification in models E2 and I2 indicates 
that the instruments fail to account for such systematic heterogeneity. As a result, the unobserved 
heterogeneity, for example, ‘better borrowers’ get bigger loans, yield what appears to be positive 
insignificant marginal impacts in the models.  
 
4 Conclusion and implications 
 
This paper examines the impact of participation in a microcredit program on rural households in the 
MRD and Vietnam. Controlling for program heterogeneity at individual, household, village, 
commune, and regional levels, the results of IV-FE models document a positive and significant 
impact of microcredit program participation and microloan size in the household per capita 
consumption at the national level. Greater impacts were identified for the microcredit programme in 
the MRD compared to the country average, assuming that the endogeneity was significantly 
controlled for in the models. This greater impact is largely attributed to the observed factors at the 
regional level; however, unobserved factors such as, individual heterogeneity, are also believed to 
contribute to the differences. This is because the people in the MRD region are more business-
oriented than other regions, access to microcredit helps reduce the capital constraint, which likely 
improves marginal productivity of capital hence increases income and consumption. This occurs 
even in micro and small-scale business at the rural household level.  
 
One unexpected finding arising from this study is that the instrumental variable’s validity is subject 
to a time varying effect. The instrumental variables used to account for unobserved endogeneity in 
impact evaluation likely change with changes in economic conditions where the microcredit 
programmes are implemented. This is particularly so when the poverty rate of the commune 
remains valid but the distance to the nearest bank is inconsistent and insignificant. The inconsistency 
of IV may cause inconsistent impact estimators from the IV-FE models because instruments 
encountering endogeneity likely face weak instrument identification. This time varying effect 
requires extra caution when IV-FE models are used to evaluate programme impact.  
 
This study produces evidence of a long-term impact of the formal microcredit programme in rural 
areas. Future research can explore the dynamic impact of microcredit programmes. As past credit 
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and the length of microcredit participation is believed to contribute to a wider concept of impact 
evaluation, i.e., dynamic impact, a confirmation of the dynamic impact of microcredit programmes 
provides further evidence whether the programme impacts accrue beyond the participation period. 
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